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Институциональные изменения в экономике стали предметом исследований мно-
жества экономистов, однако большинство работ выполняются в рамках неоинсти-
туционализма. В данной статье предпринимается попытка анализа современных 
институциональных изменений с позиций старого или традиционного институцио-
нализма. В работе делается акцент на исследовании асинхронности трансформа-
ции механизмов регулирования, с одной стороны, и институтов, с другой. В качестве 
важного фактора при анализе изменений институтов рассматриваются коллектив-
ные действия групп специальных интересов.
Ключевые слова: институциональные изменения; коллективные действия; инсти-
туциональная инерция; дихотомия Веблена; группы специальных интересов.
Institutional changes in the economy have been the research subject of many economists, the 
majority of studies are carried out within neoinstitutionalism. In this paper the author attempts to 
analyze current institutional changes in terms of the old or traditional institutionalism. The author 
focuses, on the one hand, on the study of asynchrony transformation of regulation mechanisms, 
and institutions, on the other hand. As an important factor the collective action of special interest 
groups are considered in the analysis of institutional changes.
Keywords: institutional changes; collective action; institutional inertia; Veblen’s 
dichotomy; special interest groups.
Коды классификатора JEL: B50, B52, D02, O33, B25.
I
For many years economists working in various theoretical schools have paid great 
regard to institutional changes in economy. Most researches of institutional changes are 
carried out within the neoinstitutional or the new institutional economics frameworks. 
However the use of heuristic potential of original (old) institutional economics can enrich 
modern theories of institutional changes.
Institutionalism as an important scientifi c school has considerably strengthened its 
positions for the last twenty years. It is caused by:
1)  the development of the neoinstitutional or the new institutional economic 
theory which bec-ame the major direction of evolution of the modern 
neoclassical economic theory;
© V.Volchik, 2011
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Facilities of original institutional economics in research of institutional changes
2)  the necessity of interpretation of radical institutional transformations in eco-
nomic traditions of the post socialist countries, as well as considerable 
acceleration of the rate of institutional changes in the majority of national 
economies;
3) the increased value of non-orthodox economic theories which increasingly 
determine the development of perspective scientifi c schools in the modern 
economic theory. Old or original institutional economics along with post Key-
nesianism and the Austrian school which are non-orthodox schools generate 
the theories that give a relevant explanation of modern institutional 
transformations and globalization processes in a postindustrial society.
Within the framework of the new institutional economic theory the role of institutes 
as the restrictions at realization of different economic actions is emphasized. New 
institutional economics is also concentrated on defi ning the institutes as restrictions 
while the main feature of old institutional economics consists in modeling the institu-
tes as defi ning factors of agents informative ability (Khalil 1995, 445–66). Hodgson 
also proves that the defi ning line of new institutional economics is that, generally, 
institutes infl uence upon behaviour of given individuals as restrictions1. Besides, 
according to prevailing opinion of neoinstitutionalists, institutes are the results of the 
individuals choices and, thus, cannot cause an individual choice (Dequech 2002, 567).
First of all, institutes have the information nature. Thanks to them individuals not 
only receive the information on the permitted and forbidden actions, but also form 
their behavioral and informative models, which defi ne human actions.
Theoretical heritage of original institutional economics can provide very useful 
instruments for investigations of modern institutional changes. Within the limits of 
this article from a variety of concepts of original institutional economics are used 
the research tools of the theory of collective actions of J. Commons (elements of 
which have received refl ection in M. Olson’s works2) and Veblen’s dichotomy for an 
explanation of institutional changes.
II
Formation of effective modern economy requests updating of old institutes and 
creation of new ones. The evolution of institutes is closely associated with mechanisms 
of regulation which can include measures of state economic policy, and also actions 
of organizations and groups of special interests. Therefore the Veblen’s concept of 
dichotomy and institutional inertia can help with the analysis of modern institutional 
changes.
1 For more details, see: Hodgson, G.M. (2003). Theory of economics and institutes: Manifesto modern 
institutional theory of economics. M. (Более подробно См.: Ходжсон Дж. (2003). Экономическая теория 
и институты: Манифест современной институциональной экономической теории. М.) Hodgson, G.M. 
(1998). The Approach of Institutional Economics // Journal of Economic Literature. Vol 36. No. 1. 166–192.
2 Although M. Olson is represent most probably Public choice theory, which converging with neoclassic, in his 
works and fi rst of all «Logic public action» affect infl uence Commons’ ideas. (Хотя М. Олсон является пред-
ставителем скорее теории общественного выбора, которая конвергентна с неоклассикой, в его работах 
и прежде всего в «Логике коллективных действий» заметно влияние идей Дж. Коммонса).
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Institutes are traditionally interpreted by economists as rules and mechanisms 
providing their performance, and norms of behavior which structure repeating in-
teractions between people (North 1993, 73). Further we will adhere to this interpretation 
of institutes. Along with institutes considerable infl uence on economic development 
is made by regulation mechanisms. Regulation mechanisms represent a class of power 
connections and relations resulting in the organization of economic processes within 
the limits of state and corporate structures and other organizations.
There is a phenomenon described by T. Veblen in the last century which is ty-
pical for postindustrial economy. Subsequently the phenomenon has been called 
«Veblen’s dichotomy» (sometimes the term «dichotomy of Veblen-Ayres» is used 
by authors, stressing the contribution of Clarence Ayres in the research of the 
given problem). Usually Veblen’s dichotomy is connected with the contradictions 
arising during social changes between progressive technologies and the institu-
tes, which hinder development. Traditionally the agenda of Veblen’s dichotomy 
is at the core of the theoretical agenda of old institutional economics (Wisman 
and Smith 1999, 887–902).
Veblen noticed repeatedly in his works (Veblen 1984; 2007), that institutes 
which are regarded as modern in given period are the results and also the refl ection 
of previous development and functioning of economic processes and the activity 
of individuals and organizations. Veblen’s dichotomy allows us to concentrate on 
one important feature of economic development of a society. This feature can be 
characterized as asynchrony of the evolutions of mechanisms of the organization, 
production management and state regulation tools, on one hand, and rules, institutes 
and institutional agreements, on the other.
Contradictions between organizational forms and stable rules and mechanisms of 
enforcement, i.e. institutes, consist in asynchrony of their alteration rates. During the 
epoch of industrial revolution the given phenomenon was analyzed by T. Veblen as a 
dichotomy between the industry and business (Veblen 2007). In Veblen’s dichotomy 
business institutes focused on profi t, represent the regressive force. On the contrary, 
the industry advanced by engineers according to technical progress and their skills, is 
the progressive force. We will not analyze in details the fact, whether T. Veblen who 
developed the theory in the end of XIX–beginning of the XX century was right or 
not. Important is the fact that Veblen specifi ed the contradiction between inert, slowly 
developing institutes and more dynamical technological changes and requirements of 
technological and economic policy.
Usually the introduction of new technologies is considered as an evolutionary 
process, and the decrease in entropy of system, as well as the increase in quantity 
of energy and information are regarded as selection criteria (Weinel and Crossland 
1989, 795–808). We can designate three central concepts of economic evolution: 
variety sources, a choice of environment and the transfer mechanism (Nooteboom 
1999, 129). The given abstract sight at dynamical development of a technological 
choice doesn’t pay enough attention to such factors, as social norms, the market 
power and a state policy (Wisman and Smith 1999, 887–902). However, infl uence 
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Facilities of original institutional economics in research of institutional changes
of market forces and institutes on dynamics of technological changes is essen-
tial. Moreover, many researchers connect the possibility of working out and intro-
duction of new technologies with the formation of institutional conditions (Rosen-
berg and Birdtsel-Jr. 1995).
Institutes, ordering or forbidding certain actions and (or) interactions of economic 
actors, form preconditions for long-term and repeating relations and transactions. 
Institutes create a set of possible variants of social action that makes actions of 
individuals predictable and, hence, reduces probability of deformation or destruction 
of the social system. Social changes are an important factor of social progress. 
Here we again face the fundamental dichotomy between institutes with their inertia 
and a constancy and necessity of formation of new structures of management and 
technologies. In our opinion, institutes and management mechanisms (as well as 
technologies), should be considered irrespective of their progressive or regressive 
role which they play during given developmental stage. In Veblen’s dichotomy the 
progressive role of techno structure and regressive role of capitalist institutes reduces 
the explanatory force of this theory in relation to evolutionary institutional changes.
Asynchrony of technological development and regulation mechanisms is the 
reason of the signifi cant dichotomy, which defi nes laws of development of different 
economic orders. At fi rst sight existing institutes represent an inert force, which 
restrains step-by-step and progressive development of technologies, of global markets 
and the realization of modernization projects. However, it is not so. The degree of 
asynchrony between technologies and regulation mechanisms on the one hand, and 
institutes — on the other, infl uences the stability of an economic order. High degree 
of asynchrony can lead to destruction of economy and crisis corresponding to the 
moment of radical institutional transformation in the model of a bottleneck in evolu-
tion of institutes (Volchik 2005, 185–204). Thus, Veblen’s dichotomy can be conside-
red as a special case of asynchronous evolution of institutes and technologies. And 
it seems to be correct not to make any estimated judgments concerning progressive-
ness of technologies and techno structure on the one hand, and institutes, on the other.
Since the concept of Veblen’s dichotomy puts investigation of power in the centre 
of the agenda of the economic theory (Atkinson 1995), the analysis of special interests 
groups actions can become a key to understanding the infl uence of asynchrony of 
development on evolution of the institutional structure of an economic order (Volchik 
and Berezhnoy 2007). Incompetent statesmen who develop ineffi cient measures of 
regulation will cause a smaller loss to economy if the institutional structure contains 
strong market and democratic institutes3.
The history shows us an example of continuous interaction of two forces: dyna-
mic force of technologies which promotes changes and static force of offi cial statuses 
and traditions which hinder the changes (Ayres 1978, 176). Individuals and groups 
3 In a common, this statement is coordinated with the model offered by G.V. Egorov and K.I. Sonin. See: 
Egorov, G.V. and Sonin, К.I. (2008). Dictators and viziers: the economic theory of loyalty and competence // 
Social studies and the present. No 2. 36–51. (Это утверждение в целом согласуется с моделью предложен-
ной Г.В. Егоровым и К.И. Сониным. См.: Егоров Г.В. и Сонин К.И. (2008). Диктаторы и визири: эконо-
мическая теория лояльности и компетентности // Общественные науки и современность. № 2. 36–51).
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28 V. Volchik
introducing new technologies, face resistance of economic agents who are interested 
in preservation of old technologies. Such resistance can reach considerable scales, 
as in the case with Luddites movement. It is interesting, that the importance and 
force of Luddites movement differed depending on institutes and economic culture 
in various regions of England (Randali 1991). Thus, the degree of discrepancy of 
new organizational forms to economic culture and institutes defi nes the degree of 
reaction of the basic actors. Moreover, the asynchrony between introduction of 
technologies, organizational mechanisms and institutes in the modern world, leads 
to the phenomenon of neo-Luddites (Frobish 2002, 207–215). And though the 
results of activity of neo-Luddites hardly will stop technical progress, but they can 
create considerable diffi culties in case of slow or inadequate institutional changes. 
Moreover, mechanisms of regulation formed after introduction of new technologies 
demand additional researches of a problem of monopoly in hi-tech fi elds (Ellison and 
Fudenberg 2000, 253–272).
If we consider the times of industrial revolution of the end of XVIII–XIX cen-
turies, it is possible to observe an example of asynchronous development of tec-
hnologies and methods of the organization of production and economic institutes. 
Many contemporaries had a negative attitude to «industrial revolution» and the term 
itself for the majority of people had a negative connotation (Cameron 2001, 206).
Technological changes will run faster, the newer and less controlled is the branch 
of their introduction. For example, in days of industrial revolution in England cotton 
manufacture was a new branch; it was less regulated by legislation, by shop rules and 
traditional practice which interfered with technological changes, unlike woolen and 
linen manufacture where development of these branches was restrained by tradition 
and regulation (Cameron 2001, 218–221).
In the context of the model of asynchronous evolution of mechanisms of regulation 
and institutes it is possible to give an explanation to Anthony Giddens’s «paradox of 
democracy». According to his concept, «The paradox of democracy is that while it 
extends worldwide, in mature democratic states which other world should apparently 
imitate, grows the disappointment in democratic processes» (Giddens 2004, 85–86). 
Disappointment in politicians is fi rst of all the refl ection of discontent and aversion 
of those mechanisms of realization of a state policy (including economic) which 
are not coordinated with existing institutes. But in the same work Giddens notices, 
that according to some sociological surveys, which were held in the USA and other 
western large countries, more than 90% of the population have declared the approving 
attitude to the democratic form of governing. Also surveys show, that the population 
of developed countries does not lose interest to a policy and with trust concerns the 
basic democratic institutes (Giddens 2004, 87–88).
Depending on degree of asynchrony of changes we can make conclusions only 
about stability and rates of changes of different economic orders. The situation when 
development of institutes overtakes the rates of new techno structure formation is 
possible. In that case the process of institutional changes will be an important factor 
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Facilities of original institutional economics in research of institutional changes
of adoption or intensifi cation of scientifi c researches and inventions for industrial and 
trading needs.
Asynchrony of institutional changes, on the one hand, and of technologies, ma-
nagement and regulation mechanisms, on the other, also illustrate a phenomenon of 
institutional inertia. As O. Williamson noticed (Williamson 2000, 595–613), iner-
tia is inherent to the uppermost level of institutional hierarchies — «the social 
involvement» to which he relates customs, morals, traditions, religion the greatest. 
This top level of hierarchy defi nes long-term tendencies of social order evolution. 
It is necessary to consider, that the longer develops the reformed institutional system, 
the more inert it will become. And one of the most important roles is played here 
by groups of special interests which in the majority of longtime stable societies are 
considered to be the reason of social sclerosis (Olson 1995).
Application of the evolutionary approach to the analysis of economic transformations 
allows us to make a conclusion that behavioral models of the basic economical subjects 
cannot be changed for a short time interval because of the effect of institutional inertia. 
At the analysis of institutional changes in economy it is necessary to consider the 
infl uence of institutional «genotype» of the previous economic order. Institutional 
genotype is refl ected, fi rst of all, in the existence of steady informal rules, customs 
and traditions which, fi rst of all, form the stereotypes of economic behavior and 
economic culture as a whole. Such infl uence corresponds to cultural national tradition. 
The involvement of groups with narrow and comprehensive interests in the sphere of 
this or that rule and institute (Olson 1995) creates conditions for functioning within 
the limits of a social order of such rules and institutes.
The formation of markets is fi rst of all connected with the process of evolution of 
rules and institutes which set action frameworks for cooperating economical players 
(Hodgson 2007, 7–25). However the above mentioned process can be very long or 
diffi cult connected with the creation of institutional structure of the markets with a 
specifi c exchanging property rights. For example, modern fi nancial markets can be 
considered as such markets.
Institutional inertia is also considered to be a protective reaction of the system to 
the destroying it institutional and technological innovations (Hodgson 2007, 7–25). 
If it was possible to implement all innovations, the system simply wouldn’t be able 
to function normally in the case of contradictions between the implemented institutes 
and technologies.
It is necessary to consider, that institutes not only set preferences, but also set 
structure of stimulus which, in turn, can infl uence the choice of economic agents 
(Schmid 2004, 2). Therefore considering various economic orders and types of eco-
nomic development, it is, fi rst of all, necessary to consider available institutes and 
also historical regularities of their evolution.
Some social institutes show different economic effi ciency depending on what 
historical and time frameworks they are considered. Historic facts about the role of the 
institute of family in various cultures can be considered as an important illustration. 
For example, broad debate concerning the role of the Chinese family as an agent 
JO
U
RN
AL
 O
F 
EC
ON
OM
IC
 R
EG
U
LA
TI
ON
 (
Во
пр
ос
ы
 р
ег
ул
ир
ов
ан
ия
 э
ко
но
м
ик
и)
   
? 
   
То
м
 2
,  
№
 4
.  
20
11
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of original and productive family capitalism in China (Lal 2007, 166). In White’s 
review on the given problem there are two opposite opinions about the economic 
role of Chinese family (White 1996, 1–30). The role of the Chinese family institute 
evolved from unequivocally regressive, standing on the way of economic progress, 
to progressive institute on which the modern family business enterprises are based in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (Lal 2007).
The recognition of inertia of changes of institutes and behavioral samples de-
mands attachment to any reforms a genetic character that means transferring the ac-
cent from a desirable end result to really existing heritage of the past (Oleynik 
2004, 81). Hence, the system can be closed on its previous ineffi cient institutional 
luggage. And if changes in market and administrative mechanisms of regulation 
are accelerated, the probability of negative consequences of institutional inertia 
increases.
III
According to the concept of one of the most well-known representatives of origi-
nal institutional economics John Commons, the nature of institutes is fi rst of all 
connected with social actions. Commons noticed that as the benefi ts are economically 
limited; their acquisition is regulated by social action. Social action creates the rights 
and duties concerning the property and freedom without which anarchy would reign in 
a society. Institutional economy gives to social action its own place in the arrangement 
of confl icts and order preservation in the world of limited resources, private property 
and inconsistency (Commons 1990, 7). The central place in institutional economy of 
J. Commons is given to power structures and groups of infl uence whose actions form 
the institutional environment.
According to Commons, except maintenance of order and arrangement of con-
fl icts power structures should use working rules for cooperation encouragement 
in manufacture and exchange, and also in the solution of serious problems which 
have arisen owing to a pursuit of own benefi t as a result of economic interactions. 
These functions do not arise automatically according to Smith’s «system of natural 
liberties», but should be generated by corresponding stimulus created by «a visible 
hand of the state», and should be put into practice by means of various sanctions, 
including threat of physical violence (Commons 1990).
Such social action creates state structures which form the working rules, which 
direct the individual action. While the basic power in the society is concentrated in 
state hands, the set of other groups and organizations (for example, such as com-
mercial and industrial chambers and associations of businessmen) also own a share 
of independence and, hence, create and put into practice their own working rules and 
rules of behavior.
Commons speaks about hierarchy of governance structure, such as the busi-
ness enterprises, trade unions, church and the family. These formal organizations, 
and also collectively defi ned set of working rules as social norms, ethical principles 
and customs represent institutes — the concept which Commons defi nes as 
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Facilities of original institutional economics in research of institutional changes
«a social action for restriction, liberation and expansion of individual action» 
(Commons 1931, 651).
Elimination of confl icts and maintenance of an order demands, that the transfer 
and use of the property rights were regulated by rules and conventions in which 
concepts of exchange, methods of payment and duties of the parties in the course 
of an exchange are registered. Since institutes represent a network of working rules 
defi ning the rights, duties, liberties and the sphere of their action, they infl uence 
contracts.
Two aspects of contracting are the most important. The fi rst one consists in 
the necessity of a steadfast attention to the fundamental role of independence and 
confl ict in economic activities. Commons attaches special importance to the bounded 
rationality, to the imperfection of information and uncertainty of the future. As a result, 
cont-racts inevitably become defective, and people resort to strategic agreements and 
opportunistic behavior. All the above mentioned information contains his «psycholo-
gy of negotiations»; the last falls under a standard term of egotism defi ned as «gaining 
as more benefi ts as possible and as less damage as possible without paying any 
attention to interests of other people if there is no restriction which is impossible to 
overcome» (Kaufman 2003, 75). Thus, confl icts are inevitable, and for their solution 
lawful courts and neutral third parties are required.
The second key aspect of the contract is nature of legal relations which he creates 
between the parties. It was mentioned above, that Commons defi nes the property 
rights, and not the exchange of physical welfares, as the basis of institutional economy. 
It leads him to the concept of transaction which he describes as a fundamental unit of 
measure in institutional theory.
According to Commons individual actions are integrated into social ones, and 
transactions were the initial unit of the analysis. Internalization of customs through 
habits is the central element in social actions while individual actions need to be 
supervised. According to Commons institutes are being built from unorganized tra-
ditions to organized «general unit». Commons defi nes the term « general unit» as «a 
joint expectation» of benefi ts from three types of transaction which are carried out for 
the account of «working rules» and by means of the control of varying strategic or 
restrictive factors which in their turn should supervise others. Society supervises the 
individuals with the help of working rules. These rules vary with change of institutes. 
Each institute has its rules, and rules differ among institutes. Rules arise from decisions 
of confl ict termination (Forest, Mehier, Commons and Herbert 2001).
The change of institutes within the range of Commons’ concept is fi rst of all the 
result of adaptation through a choice of the best institutional alternatives as a result 
of social actions. The principle of a purposeful choice stresses the decision-making 
role of those, who can choose and defi ne relevant rules. Hence, individuals through 
social actions can choose and defi ne rules for economic interactions. It is connected 
with the problem of rules formation and their coordination with available institutional 
structure, elimination of confl icts and creation of new possibilities for realization of 
transaction.
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32 V. Volchik
The further development of Commons’ ideas is refl ected in works of M. Olson 
who has applied the formal device of neoclassic to the analysis of process of optimal 
manufacture of social welfare which can be institutes.
The evolution of institutes in a modern society also cannot be considered apart 
from interests of individuals and organizations involved in their actions. Interests can 
either coincide with stimulus, rules and restrictions set by institutional structure, or 
contradict them. However the change of status quo demands organized actions on 
creation and introduction of an alternative institutional innovation. It is impossible to 
deny the possibilities of spontaneous evolution of institutes, i.e. without purposeful 
action of groups of special interests. However such variant in the short-term and 
medium-term periods seems less probable. Moreover, if to consider evolution of 
institutes not in Robinson Crusoe’s and Friday’s hypothetical society, but in realities 
of modern economic orders, the actions on introduction of institutional innovations 
will be somehow connected with actions of narrow or comprehensive groups of 
special interests4.
Such groups can exist either in obvious, or in implicit kind. For example, different 
trade unions represent particular groups of special interests which often play a role 
of institutional innovators. However the introduced institutional innovation can exist 
in the form of formal institute for a long time even in the case when the trade union, 
which initiated its acceptance, stops its existence. But here we face a case, when 
the formal group is replaced with an informal group with comprehensive (or on 
occasion special) interests, included in the action of the given rule and enforcement 
mechanisms, which constitute the institute.
M. Olson’s model of collective actions of special interests groups is the general 
theory (formal and metatheoretical)5 which can give us only conceptual frameworks 
(frames) or patterns for decision-making or research problems in the conditions of 
limited rationality.
If the society lacks groups interested in execution of rules, which contains the 
institute (even having formal character) such institute ceases to function de facto, but 
exists as integral norm de jure. Therefore we can connect the process of evolution of 
institutes with the process of formation and transformation of interest groups.
Organizational structures and regulation mechanisms can also be formed under 
the infl uence of both individual and social action. However their formation is 
connected with purposeful search of optimum (probably in some cases satisfactory) 
4 About actions of groups with narrow and comprehensive interests see more in detail: Olson, M. (1998). 
Eminence and decline of the people. Economic growth, stagfl ation and a social sclerosis. Novosibirsk; Olson, M. 
(1995). Logic of collective actions. The public blessings and the theory of groups. М. (О действиях групп 
с узкими и всеохватывающими интересами см. подробнее: Олсон М. (1998). Возвышение и упадок на-
родов. Экономический рост, стагфляция и социальный склероз. Новосибирск; Олсон М. (1995). Логика 
коллективных действий. Общественные блага и теория групп. М.); Olson, M.Jr. (1995). The Devolution of 
the Nordic and Teutonic Economies // American Economic Review. May. V. 85. № 2; Papers and Proceedings 
of the Hundredth and Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association Washington, DC, 
January 6–8, 1995.
5  See: Budon, R. (1998). Disorder place. Criticism of theories of society changing. M.: Aspect Press. 245–248. 
(См: Будон Р. (1998). Место беспорядка. Критика теорий социального изменения. М: Аспект Пресс. 
245–248).
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mechanisms of authoritative coordination. Here we can face a problem when 
purposes and methods and regulation mechanisms contradict existing institutes which 
have developed evolutionarily. It can be described within the limits of an offered 
theoretical asynchrony of institutes developments and mechanisms of regulation and 
technologies.
Any state represents a diffi cult organization where a certain balance of interests 
of basic infl uential groups is reached. However the concept of a state as a settled 
gangster (Olson 1995) is also realistic. But the nature of such a settled gangster is 
represented not individual, but social. That means groups can (and should) come 
to a consensus concerning collecting incomes (rent, taxes) from the under control 
population involved in the given social order. The social order is characterized by 
a stable set of institutes which form space of possibilities in all spheres of a public 
life.
At the evolutionary analysis of action of special interests groups it is necessary to 
defi ne what is selected in the development of an economic order. Within the limits of 
our concept are selected, i.e. arise, stop their existence, increase or reduce the quantity 
of participants groups of interests either with narrow, or comprehensive interests. 
However the most important point is the fact, that groups of interests are considered 
as innovators, which initiate the creation of institutes, and also support the structure 
of social connections and stimulus which defi ne the order of their functioning.
As the group is considered in the light of an involvement of action of different 
institutes, change of personal membership in the group does not render strong 
infl uence on rules, routines and institutes which are supported by the group. As an 
example from the Russian history can be considered the economic and enterprise 
activity of Old Believers who followed certain informal institutes, for example, 
specifi c economic ethics (Benam and Benam 1999).
It is necessary to consider the problem of long functioning of stable groups. In 
transition economy the infl uence of special interests groups on the process of institute 
creation is shown most obviously in a short time interval. However ex ante is very 
diffi cult to defi ne, how the introduction of this or that institute will be refl ected in 
economic effi ciency. Institutes introduced by narrow groups of special interests, for 
the purposes of redistribution and extraction of the rent are more probable to be less 
effective, than the institutes introduced by groups with comprehensive interests.
The fundamental reason of an ineffi ciency of groups of interests as institutional 
innovators is their long stability and irremovability within the limits of political 
system. After M. Olson’s works became standard the thesis that big groups provide 
their members with collective benefi ts worse, than small groups. Also big groups 
are less stable. Therefore, if the problem of stability of interest groups or «a social 
sclerosis» can be solved at the expense of fl exibility of political institutes that gives 
an opportunity for a society with an abundance of groups of special interest groups to 
form and function economic and political institutes effectively6. But in traditional and 
underdeveloped societies where the majority of social communities are represented 
6  For example: economic of Scandinavian countries.
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by primary groups and religious communities, the principle of «a social sclerosis», 
destruction and removability of groups should be considered taking into account the 
peculiarity of such societies and their economic systems.
Following the logic of M. Olson, the main causes of regress of institutional 
structures of rich, developed economy are actions of groups of special interests in an 
affected by «a social sclerosis society» and, as consequence, a choice of inadequate 
economic policy which, eventually, leads to relative and absolute delay of economic 
growth (Olson 1995; 1996, 3–24).
Groups of special interests gradually form institutional environment with higher 
characteristics of inertness and, hence, steadier against external shocks of institutional 
import. However such groups inevitably form preconditions for formation of a social 
sclerosis which, in turn, inevitably leads to stagnation. There arises a question: what 
built in mechanisms can the society generate for opposition to the tendency of an 
inevitable social sclerosis as consequences of long periods of stable development of 
a society with amplifying groups of narrow special interests? It is possible to offer 
the following explaining hypothesis: effective economic development in the long-
term period is possible if mechanisms periodically destroy or update the structure 
of special interests groups evolutionarily developed in a society are formed. The 
updating process of groups of interests should reduce the degree of asynchrony 
changes. On the other hand, actions of stable and long existing groups (mainly with 
narrow interests) will promote increase of asynchrony which can lead to system crisis 
and destruction of institutes.
The evolution of special interests groups has in many respects defi ned directions 
and quality of updating processes. The West phenomenon is in many respects defi ned 
by formation of independent and competing groups of interests. Globalization forms not 
only new mechanisms and channels of communications, but also changes the quality of 
institutes which, in turn, set rules and restrictions for the basic economic actors.
Modern trends of development of economy and society are neither absolutely 
new, nor irreversible. Often irreversibility of globalization and economic progress 
is proved by facts of development of technologies (Grinin 2008, 125). However the 
given thesis is not obvious taking into account a large quantity of historical examples 
when technological and institutional innovations underwent process of regression.
Discussion of the role of groups of special interests groups in the evolution of 
institutes cannot be conducted apart from the question of allocation and identifi cation 
of specifi c groups and defi nition of the degree of their infl uence. There is a requirement 
both in the historical description of formation and functioning process of such groups, 
and measurement and statistical representation of parameters of various groups of 
interests. Sociologists and political scientists have saved up a lot of data which can be 
used by economists. However it is still diffi cult to fi nd the data, which allows defi ning 
or illustrating signifi cant dependences between actions of groups and formation of 
institutes. Here we face diffi culties of acquisition of relevant data. Probably, here 
exist not only technical, but more methodological obstacles. The classifi cation of 
groups of interests depends on the existing in the society tradition of lobbying and 
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its institutional economics. In case of transition economies the problem of accurate 
classifi cation of groups of interest groups becomes complicated because of the 
mobility of institutional restrictions.
According to the concept of a bottle neck in the evolution of institutes of a gspecial 
interests group is that unit which passes selection (Volchik 2004). If interest groups 
collapse or transform, so that there is nobody in this or that society to support the 
fulfi llment of this or that rule or to carry out sanctions for its nonfulfi lment. However 
interest groups as already mentioned above, are diffi cult to defi ne accurately, especially 
in relation to specifi c institutes. Therefore carrying out a particular research we should 
compare benefi ts and costs from actions on identifi cation of specifi c groups, gathering 
and estimation of quantitative data.
If we investigate the evolution of institute which has a certain rank in the 
system of economic communications, it is necessary for us to defi ne a group which 
is interested in or benefi ts from an existing state of affairs. Eventually groups will 
change their structure. But the personal structure will not have a crucial signifi cance 
if the institute is supported by the group in its new structure. In other words, the 
evolution of institutes and groups of interests is considered as interconnected and 
interdependent processes. However the development of new rules, agreements and 
institutes demands considerably stronger unity of groups, and also can be connected 
with higher costs of social actions, than the maintenance of functioning of institutes.
Between the buildings of original and new institutional economics there should 
not be any impenetrable walls. It is also important to understand, that researches of 
evolution of institutes should promote decrease in monopolization of the market of 
scientifi c ideas. Therefore the given article is an attempt of research of institutional 
changes from convergence positions of institutional approaches in the economic 
theory. The phenomenon of asynchrony of changes focuses its attention on that «the 
growth» of effective institutes should correlate with the formation of corresponding 
mechanisms of regulation and social actions of groups of interests.
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